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“[W]e are made up of stories. And 
even the ones that seem the most like 
lies can be our deepest hidden truths.” 
Jane Yolen, Briar Rose. 
 
Abstract 
Fiction has always been part of 
human beings, accompanying them 
even in the most difficult situations of 
life. In fact, certain victims of acute 
trauma may tend to mask and evade 
the pain they suffer by creating their 
own fictional world as a means of 
escaping from reality. This has 
become a recurrent theme in 
contemporary literature, as in the 
cases of Jane Yolen’s Briar Rose and 
John Boyne’s The Boy in the Striped 
Pyjamas, whose characters would 
respectively block a traumatic 
memory by replacing it with a fantasy 
Resumen 
La ficción siempre ha formado 
parte del ser humano, acompañándole en 
las situaciones más difíciles de la vida. 
De hecho, algunas víctimas de grave 
trauma psicológico pueden enmascarar y 
evadir el dolor que sufren creando su 
propio mundo de ficción para escapar de 
la realidad. Esto se ha convertido en un 
tema recurrente en la literatura contem-
poránea, como en Briar Rose, de Jane 
Yolen y The Boy in the Striped Pyjamas 
de John Boyne, cuyos protagonistas, 
respectivamente, bloquearán una memo-
ria traumática sustituyéndola por una 
fantasía o se negarán obstinadamente a 
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or stubbornly refuse to see the painful 
reality in front of their eyes choosing 
over it a less harsh fictional 
alternative. Through the analysis of 
these two books, this article will 
compare and contrast these two 
different ways to deny a traumatic 
reality and will highlight the necessity 
to recover those repressed memories 
not only to work through past 
traumas, but to give voice and pay 
homage to those overcome by them. 
Key Words:  Trauma, Holocaust 
fiction, Work through, Repression, 
Memory, Jane Yolen, John Boyne. 
ver la dolorosa realidad, optando por otra 
imaginaria y menos dura. A través del 
análisis de estos dos libros, el presente 
artículo comparará y contrastará estas 
dos formas diferentes de negar una 
realidad traumática y enfatizará la 
necesidad de recuperar la memoria 
reprimida, no sólo para superar traumas 
del pasado, sino para dar voz y 
homenajear a aquellos que fueron 
devastados por ellos. 
 
Palabras clave: Trauma, Ficción 
sobre el Holocausto, Proceso de 
superación del trauma, Represión, 
Memoria, Jane Yolen, John Boyne. 
 
Stories, as the above quotation suggests, constitute a fundamental part of 
human beings, their evolution and their conception of the self. It is for this 
reason that men have always made use of them in all aspects of their lives, 
either positive or negative. Therefore, fiction –even lies– and fairy tales have 
always accompanied men and helped them hide (from) the most unpleasant 
parts of their surrounding environment or even themselves. Mythologies, for 
instance, were born in antiquity in order to fill in the void of a given cultural 
emptiness; be it the lack of certainty about the origin of man or the order of the 
universe. Just as Jack Zipes points out in his book Spells of Enchantment,  
both the oral and the literary forms of the fairy tale are grounded in 
history: they emanate from specific struggles to humanize bestial and 
barbaric forces, which have terrorized our minds and communities in 
concrete ways, threatening to destroy free will and human compassion. The 
fairy tale sets out to conquer this concrete terror through metaphors. (1991:xi) 
Similarly, victims of acute trauma often tend to mask the underlying effects 
of their terrorizing experiences in order to escape the suffering that those entail. 
Or, as Jeffrey Alexander argues, “[w]hen bad things happen to good people, 
[…] they can become so frightened that they can actually repress the experience 
of trauma itself” (2004:5). Such repression can occur in two different ways; it 
can be automatically exerted by the psyche itself as a mechanism of defence, as 
Freud maintains, or it can be a conscious and wilful process. This way, trauma 
can be voluntarily blocked by the individual in question as an attempt to either 
avoid remembering a series of painful past recollections or to evade himself 
from a traumatic present. In some cases, the trauma victim may even choose to 
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construct an alternative –fictional– world that would replace the actual –real– 
experience rather than facing the consequences of the trauma, which is what, as 
the following article proposes, both Gemma and Bruno achieve in, respectively, 
Jane Yolen’s Briar Rose and John Boyne’s The Boy in the Striped Pyjamas. 
Before being applied to mental illnesses, the word trauma, deriving from 
the Greek word traumatizo, was firstly used to refer to a “bodily injury caused 
by an external agent” (Luckhurst 2008:1). Centuries later, Freud extended this 
definition to cover also those wounds inflicted upon an individual’s mind, or, to 
quote his own words, “[s]uch external excitations as are strong enough to break 
against the barrier against stimuli” that protects the mind (Freud 1922:34). The 
pleasure principle, Freud continues, is in charge of keeping the amount of those 
excitations to a minimum (1922:81), and, although checked by the reality 
principle in normal circumstances, (1922:5) it can, at times, become dominant 
and completely block out pain. As a consequence, when those external 
excitations become too strong for the psyche to bear them without producing 
immense pain, a series of mechanisms will be immediately put in action in 
order to protect it, including that of repression. However, although blocking the 
painful event does momentarily soothe the mind, those forgotten memories are 
bound to reappear in a series of symptomatic manifestations that would haunt 
the victim and keep the trauma alive until it is properly worked through. Freud 
called these symptoms “the return of the repressed” (1939:164). As a 
consequence of this, it could be argued that trauma is not –or at least not 
exclusively– the blow inflicted to the mind, but also, and most importantly, the 
subsequent symptoms derived from it. 
The majority of those –namely nightmares, repetitive compulsions, 
melancholia, sense of fragmentation, etc.– are a direct result of these blocking 
processes. As has already been said, repression cannot only be this automatic 
psychic defence, but also a wilful process carried out by the affected individual 
him/herself which, understandable as it may be, hinders nonetheless the 
necessary path to recovery. Victims may, therefore, either completely block the 
painful memories, choosing to turn a blind eye to their traumatic experiences, or 
mask them under a layer or fictional substitutive remembrances built around a 
fantasy. Reality, in many cases, can be far too painful to bear, and individuals 
may therefore prefer to invent parallel narratives in order to soften its dramatic 
impact. Of late, this particular characteristic of the workings of trauma has been 
used in an array of different written and filmic plots. Kurt Vonnegut, for 
example, would present Billy Pilgrim, the main character in Slaughterhouse 5, 
as a “peculiar” character that constructs his post-traumatic self around the 
delusional idea that he is able to travel back and forth in time as well as to the 
distant planet of Tralfamadore. Similarly, in Roberto Benigni’s Life is Beautiful 
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(1997) Guido creates a whole story in order to protect his son from the ugly 
truth during their stay in a Nazi concentration camp. 
Both instances are samples in which the individuals consciously –perhaps 
more clearly so in Guido’s case– build up those fantastic realities in order to 
block painful experiences, only, for Billy’s part those are past memories and in 
Life is Beautiful, the disguised truth is happening at the time of the blockage. In 
John Boyne’s The Boy in the Striped Pyjamas, Bruno, its protagonist, also feels 
the necessity to escape from a current painful situation surrounding him. Just as 
Guido tries to protect his son’s innocence, Bruno would stubbornly deny the 
reality in front of him in order to prolong his stay in the land of childhood 
naiveté. When Bruno first spots the camp and its interns from his bedroom 
window, the view suddenly makes him feel “very cold and unsafe” (Boyne 
2007:20), and yet, after some time and a discussion with his sister, what they 
first termed as a “nasty-looking place” (Boyne 2007:32) ends up being some 
kind of farm; a much more comforting mental image. This becomes for Bruno 
the only truth he wants to believe, and, although his sister grows out of this idea, 
he is completely convinced that what lies beyond the fence is some kind of 
resort full of happy families and children to play with, as he once tells Shmuel, 
his Jewish friend: 
‘It’s so unfair,’ said Bruno. ‘I don’t see why I have to be stuck over here 
on this side of the fence where there’s no one to talk to and no one to play 
with and you get to have dozens of friends and are probably playing for hours 
every day. I’ll have to speak to Father about it.’ (Boyne 2007:111) 
This delusion goes on for the rest of his stay at the camp, and we can find 
several examples of it. Names, for instance, are a clear indicator of this 
consistent denial of reality; the softening that goes on in Bruno’s mind. He 
persistently calls his new bearings “Out-With” instead of Auschwitz, despite 
seeing the correct name written down on a bench and the fact that his sister had 
repeatedly told him to pronounce it properly. This is exactly the same approach 
that Bruno takes towards Hitler’s name, changed for “The Fury” throughout the 
whole book. Bruno is fully convinced that Shmuel’s situation is exactly the 
same as his (or even better, since he has friends to play with) and that any 
drawbacks are just attributable to misunderstandings from his part: 
‘The train was horrible,’ said Shmuel. ‘There were too many of us in the 
carriages for one thing. And there was no air to breathe. And it smelled 
awful.’ 
‘That’s because you all crowded onto one train,’ said Bruno, 
remembering the two trains he had seen at the station when he left Berlin. 
‘When we came here, there was another one on the other side of the platform 
but no one seemed to see it. That was the one we got. You should have got on 
it too.’ 
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‘I don’t think we would have been allowed,’ said Shmuel, shaking his 
head. ‘We weren’t able to get out of our carriage.’ 
‘The doors are at the end,’ explained Bruno. 
‘There weren’t any doors,’ said Shmuel. 
‘Of course there were doors,’ said Bruno with a sigh. ‘They’re at the 
end,’ he repeated. ‘Just past the buffet section.’ 
‘There weren’t any doors,’ insisted Shmuel. ‘If there had been, we 
would all have got off.’ 
Bruno mumbled something under his breath along the lines of ‘Of 
course there were’, but he didn’t say it very loud so Shmuel didn’t hear. 
(Boyne 2007:129-130) 
In spite of Shmuel’s firmness in several cases such as this, his repeating 
over and over again that it is not the same on his side of the fence, and Bruno’s 
sister’s perseverance in teaching him the proper names for both his house and 
the Führer, it is only when he crawls under the barbed wire that his fantasy 
finally collapses: 
Bruno opened his eyes in wonder at the things he saw. In his 
imagination he had thought that all the huts were full of happy families, some 
of whom sat outside in rocking chairs in the evening and told stories about 
how things were so much better when they were children and they’d had 
respect for their elders, not like the children nowadays. He thought that all 
the boys and girls who lived here would be in different groups, playing tennis 
or football, skipping and drawing out squares for hopscotch on the ground. 
He had thought that there would be a shop in the centre, and maybe a 
small café like the ones he had known in Berlin; he had wondered whether 
there would be a fruit and vegetable stall. 
As it turned out, all the things that he thought might be there –weren’t. 
(Boyne 2007:205-206) 
And yet, the truth is so self-evident, that there are times when the reader 
cannot help but wonder if the innocence that Bruno so hard-headedly wants to 
maintain is real or feigned. The question is, therefore, if in Bruno’s case 
repression is fully voluntary or not. To the present day reader, some of the clues 
in front of Bruno’s eyes seem so evident that at times it is difficult to believe 
that Bruno truthfully does not know how to interpret them. Children’s 
ingenuousness could very well be a factor here, but in truth, towards the end of 
the story, Bruno is nearly ten years old, an age at which innocence –especially 
under harsh circumstances– already starts fading. However, as the author 
himself claims, there is a feasible explanation to all this; Bruno had never 
known or even imagined that anything like the Holocaust could ever happen. It 
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was not a notion he had ever been forced to confront, and so the truth about the 
situation simply never crosses his mind: 
the idea that Bruno, an innocent nine year old, would understand the 
events taking place around him implies the hindsight knowledge gained only 
by the passing of time and the study of history. […] I stand by my believe 
that Bruno is an innocent child in a time and place that he does not 
understand; he has grown up with a father who has been in the Nazi party 
since he can remember --- why on earth would he question this when he has 
never known anything different? (www.teenreads.com) 
When dealing with mental issues, and especially in the case of trauma, in 
which so many elements play an important role in the protection of the psyche, 
it is never easy to draw boundaries and to provide complete assertions. Just as 
Freud states, “[i]t is true that all repressed material is unconscious, but not true 
that everything belonging to the Ego is conscious.” (Freud 1939: 122) A person 
may willingly refuse to see what lies in front of him/her, but this voluntary 
action may be intermingled as well with unconscious mechanisms of defence. 
In the case of Bruno, it could be argued that all these are in fact combined and 
that the blocking of the truth is carried out by a mixture of ignorance, ingenuity 
and wilful negation. The last part is especially noticeable when we take into 
account his relationship with Shmuel, his Jewish alter-ego. Even though they 
are of the exact same age –being born on the same day– Shmuel is far less 
innocent than Bruno is and seems to realize the horror of his situation much 
better than Bruno does, who, in fairness, does not seem too keen to realize: 
‘You don’t know what it’s like in here,’ said Shmuel eventually in a low 
voice, his words barely carrying across to Bruno. 
‘You don’t have any sisters, do you?’ asked Bruno quickly, pretending 
he hadn’t heard that because then he wouldn’t have to answer. (Boyne 
2007:140) 
This is only one of the moments when Bruno clearly refuses to deal with 
something that could potentially shatter his barrier of innocence; an example in 
which we could talk about wilful repression, but not the only one. When, after 
being terrorized by Lieutenant Kotler he denies having met Shmuel and 
consequently brings the young officer’s terrible wrath upon his friend’s 
shoulders, he admits blocking that memory due to shame:  
Bruno […] wanted to pretend that the incident a few months earlier 
when he had denied his friendship with Shmuel had never taken place. It still 
preyed on his mind and made him feel bad about himself, although Shmuel, 
to his credit, seemed to have forgotten all about it. (Boyne 2007:178) 
Insomuch as Bruno does consciously block certain memories that make 
him feel sad –such as the aforementioned, or the remembrance of his previous 
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life in Berlin– it could be concluded that not only his psyche, but also his 
conscious mind are going to great lengths to maintain his innocent purity and 
preserve Bruno from the trauma surrounding him. This process, despite the 
difference in age, is also evident in his mother, as Vera Farmiga –the actress 
portraying the part of the mother in the filmic version– suggests: 
She is a bit oblivious to what unfolds around her. She chooses to be 
oblivious. Elsa’s world structure is very small. She only concerns herself 
with what affects her family, the safety of her family, her and her position in 
society. […] I think, on some levels, she must intuit it. She knows that people 
are being horribly mistreated, but I think she doesn’t look. She doesn’t want 
to see because seeing it would implicate her husband. (M. Herman 2008: min 
8:46-9:55) 
Therefore, both Bruno and his mother show signs that their blockages 
could be partially voluntary and conscious, although it could be argued that 
other factors contribute equally to their barring of trauma. However, the main 
difference between their cases and that of Gemma, Jane Yolen’s protagonist, is 
that for her, we are not talking of a case of repression to impede the intrusion of 
a trauma that is occurring at the time of the blockage, but of the suppression of 
painful memories of the past. As has already been mentioned, this process can 
be accomplished by means of replacing those traumatic reminiscences with 
fictional memories or fantasies. Gemma, therefore, will repress the 
psychological trauma inflicted upon her as a result of her experience as a death 
camp survivor during World War II by identifying with the fictional character 
Briar Rose, the princess in an earlier version of Sleeping Beauty. Not only does 
she believe she was Briar Rose, an actual princess living in a castle, put to sleep 
by an evil witch and awakened by a prince, but also she keeps repeating the 
same fairy tale over and over until the time of her death to the point that her 
elder granddaughters believe she is demented. They are not far off mark, 
though, although they do not know it. Gemma, in fact, is not insane but clearly 
traumatized. Her case is that of an extensive repression under which she is—or 
she claims to be –completely unable to remember her past. When she is rescued 
by a group of partisans after being gassed and abandoned in an unmarked grave 
and they ask her about her story, her name, her origins, etc. she cannot answer 
any of those questions: 
‘I do not know. I have no memories in my head but one.’ 
‘What one?’ Holz-Wadel asked. 
‘A fairy tale.’ 
[…] 
‘What fairy tale?’ Joseph asked. 
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She shrugged. ‘I do not know its name. But in it I am a princess in a 
castle and a great mist comes over us. Only I am kissed awake. I know now 
that there is a castle and it is called ‘the schloss.’ But I do not know for sure 
if that is my castle. I only remember the fairy tale and it seems, somehow, 
that it is my story as well.’ (Yolen 2002:211) 
 And yet, as in the case of Bruno, there are certain instances in which 
Gemma seems to remember what she has supposedly forgotten, which makes 
the reader suspect that what was once repressed is struggling to arise, though 
Gemma tries hard to keep it buried. According to Freud, it may be possible that 
“certain parts of the repressed material have escaped this [repression] process, 
have remained accessible to memory and occasionally reappear in 
consciousness, but even then they are isolated, a foreign body without any 
connection with the rest of the mind” (1939:121). Even though Gemma tells the 
story of Briar Rose to her granddaughters as a fairy tale –although, as she says 
once with absent expression, for her it is “[n]ot a silly story at all.” (Yolen 
2002:151, italics in the original)– she intermingles certain images that do not 
originally pertain to the tale, and that are indicative of how Gemma’s traumatic 
images and memories– the real events– are still very much present and not at all 
forgotten. She, for instance, explains the meaning of “mist” by using, of all the 
possible synonyms, the word “exhaust” (Yolen 2002:43), which acquires 
greater significance when we discover later that she was nearly gassed to death 
inside a van at Dachau. Besides, after the evil witch casts the spell, instead of 
thorns, as in the original tale, Briar Rose’s castle is surrounded by barbed wire, 
whose meaning she refuses to explain arguing that it is better that the girls 
shouldn’t know (Yolen 2002:59) . And yet, the most indicative sign that the tale 
is nothing but a fictive construction around a traumatic real event is the way in 
which Gemma describes the evil witch as “the one in black with big black boots 
and silver eagles on her hat. […] that angel of death” (Yolen 2002:19, italics in 
the original). 
 Nowadays, those bits and pieces of information that arise despite the 
speaker’s contrary preferences are called “Freudian slips” and, in fact, it was 
Freud who realized how certain events –traumatic and non-traumatic alike–
repressed in the unconscious are bound to eventually arise one way or another:  
either the instinct has kept its strength, or it will regain it, or it is 
reawakened by a new situation. It renews its claim and […] it gains at some 
weak point new access to a so-called substitutive satisfaction which now 
appears as a symptom without the acquiescence and also without the 
comprehension of the Ego. (Freud 1939:163-164)  
 Insomuch as repression is the direct cause of those traumatic revenants 
that re-surface as symptoms, recuperating the hidden memories and 
acknowledging them is vital for the individual to finally work through the 
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trauma. Those memories, though painful as they may be, are an undeniable part 
of the person that experienced them and therefore, in order for him/her to 
recover the sense of wholeness lost as a consequence of the inflicted trauma, 
should form part of their accepted selves. This way, even if the victim does not 
fully recover, he/she can at least begin to overcome the situation. As Caroline 
Garland defends:  
for traumatized individuals to get better, the knowledge and the memory 
of the events they have suffered may need to become part of, and integrated 
into, the individual’s conscious existence, through being worked through 
instead of being walled-up in some avoided area of mental activity. (Garland 
2007:5) 
 However, this is not by any means what Gemma does and, 
consequently, she suffers from her unresolved trauma until the moment of her 
death. It manifests itself not only through the aforementioned Freudian slips but 
also through perhaps the most indicative symptom of a traumatic neurosis: 
compulsive repetition. She not only identifies herself with the fairy tale 
character of Sleeping Beauty, but she unrelentingly retells her story in almost an 
unconscious way, specially when she is about to die. Actually, this story –her 
story– is the last “rational” thought that she has before her demise: “The old 
woman struggled against the restraints, trying to sit up. […] ‘I was the 
princess!’ she cried again. ‘In the castle. The prince kissed me.’ […] ‘I am Briar 
Rose,’ Gemma was repeating. ‘I am Briar Rose.’” (Yolen 2002:16-17) 
 And yet, Gemma does not have any rational reason for her instant 
identification with the character in Briar Rose; it is all, as has already been 
explained, part of her fictionalised self created in order to escape from the 
shattering force of the trauma. She believes she was born a princess, while there 
is no proof whatsoever to back up that affirmation; she claims she lived in a 
castle, while the only castle she ever inhabited was the schloss where the 
concentration camp of Dachau was situated; she thinks she was awoken by a 
prince’s kiss after being put to sleep by an evil witch, while what saved her after 
being gassed and left in a common grave was Josef performing mouth to mouth 
resuscitation on her (or what is also called “kiss of life”).  
 On the other hand, Bruno does have plenty of reasons to identify 
himself with Shmuel, and yet he does not. He either actively refuses to do so in 
an attempt to hinder the penetration of the trauma surrounding him, or his 
infantile innocence and behaviour prevent him from making that connection. As 
has already been said, the two boys share a number of characteristics; from the 
date of their birth (same date and year for both) to their physical appearance, or 
even, to a certain extent, their current personal situation. In fact, it could be said 
that they are almost doppelgangers, or, as Bruno declares once, “like twins” 
(Boyne 2007:110). John Boyne himself refers to these coincidences in the 
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following terms: “They are reflections of each other and as they sit, cross-
legged in the dust, the fence that separates them acts as a kind of mirror image 
of the boy the other might have been.” (www.teenreads.com) The fence, 
therefore, can work as both a mirror and as a transparent glass. As a mirror, it 
would reflect the image and the world of the viewer back to him, without a 
glimpse of what lies beyond. This is what Bruno sees: a world behind the fence 
that must forcefully be a reflection of his world, while Shmuel is able to see the 
differences between the two sides and to tell them apart. And yet, at the same 
time, Shmuel realizes that the two boys could have been the same boy, as 
Boyne suggests. He is able to see the similarities between them much better 
than Bruno does:  
If it wasn’t for the fact that Bruno was nowhere near as skinny as the 
boys on his side of the fence, and not quite so pale either, it would have been 
difficult to tell them apart. It was almost (Shmuel thought) as if they were all 
exactly the same really. (Boyne 2007:203) 
 Indeed, both boys could be seen as the two faces of the same coin, and 
the identification that Shmuel makes is feasible enough. It is as if “they were all 
exactly the same really” and in fact, they suffer from the exact same fate. Once 
Bruno crosses the fence, the mirror no longer applies, and his world is left 
behind him. The differences that separated them remain at the other side of the 
fence, beyond the looking glass, in another world. Consequently, the connection 
is complete and the two boys merge in one. They were born the same day and–
almost as if fate had touched them and predestined that they would meet– bond 
and die together. The identification serves another purpose here: just as Bruno 
and Shmuel finally come to see themselves in one another, the reader gets to see 
in them not only the fate of these two boys, but of thousand others that died 
similarly. In the words of John Boyne himself: 
THE BOY IN THE STRIPED PAJAMAS [sic] is not a novel about Auschwitz, 
it is about two boys on either side of a fence at a concentration camp during 
World War II. While it is clear that I am implying a specific camp, it was 
important to me to recognise that there were many more camps in operation 
at that time, and many millions of innocents who died in Belsen, Dachau, 
Buchenwald, etc. and each of these should be remembered too. 
(www.teenreads.comm, italics in the original) 
 We should indeed remember every victim, every camp, every story, 
all the trauma and the pain that this genocide caused and causes still, and it is 
books like these that keep the memory alive. As has already been mentioned, 
recovering and maintaining an active memory of one’s traumatic past is 
essential for the individual’s recovery. According to LaCapra: 
When the past becomes accessible to recall in memory, and when the 
language functions to provide some measure of conscious control, critical 
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distance, and perspective, one has begun the arduous process of working over 
and through the trauma in a fashion that may never bring full transcendence 
of acting out (or being haunted by revenants and relieving the past in its 
shattering intensity) but which may enable processes of judgement and at 
least limited liability and ethically responsible agency. These processes are 
crucial for laying ghosts to rest, distancing oneself from haunting revenants, 
renewing an interest in life, and being able to engage memory in more 
critically tested senses. (2001:90) 
 And yet, as LaCapra highlights here, this remembering should be done 
with a degree of “conscious control,” that is, with coherence and rationality in a 
way that differs itself from the mere flashbacks and fragmentary revenants 
proper of an un-worked through trauma. Pierre Janet, as Van der Kolk and Van 
der Hart point out, already distinguished from these two types of memory as 
“narrative memory” and “traumatic memory.” The latter, they say, “has no 
social component; it is not addressed to anybody, the patient does not respond 
to anybody; it is a solitary activity” (1995:163), whereas narrative memory 
“consists of mental constructs which people use to make sense out of 
experience” (Van der Kolk and Van der Hart 1995:160) In other words, while 
traumatic memory can recur without any significance other than a compulsive 
recollection that haunts the victim of the unresolved trauma as one more of its 
psychological consequences, putting those memories in a coherent narrative 
may serve the purpose to making sense of the trauma. 
 Furthermore, if recovering the memory of the past is crucial in the 
case of individual traumas, it is tantamount when dealing with collective 
historical traumas such as the Holocaust. When a whole community suffers 
from the same painful experience, a series of ties and affective links are 
developed within its inhabitants that may result in a bonding of the collective 
affected by it. According to Erikson, this kind of shared experience touches 
each and every one of the members of the community setting them apart from 
the rest of groups and becoming “almost like a common culture, a source of 
kinship.” (1995:190) In those cases, the trauma becomes a marker of identity, or 
what has been called “foundational trauma.” Such is the instance of the Jewish 
community; where the shared trauma of the Holocaust is still very much alive in 
their collective consciousness and is a current object of study and debate highly 
useful in the pursuit of social agency. The memory of the genocide is nowadays 
present through an increasing number of memorials, museums, monuments, 
books and films or even the very camps where such tragedy took place. Such 
memorial spaces keep the memory of such atrocity alive as a means of giving 
testimony for all those who perished during it. Besides, it is necessary to make 
people aware of the historical event not only to prevent a repetition, but also as 
homage to the victims.  
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 However, Holocaust survivors have not always been so keen on 
recuperating memory. In fact, as Edkins points out, the victim’s first reaction 
was, in many cases, to leave it all behind; to forget the horror in order to 
continue with their lives. As Aharon Appelfeld claims, “anyone who underwent 
the Holocaust will be as wary of memory as of fire. It was impossible to live 
after the Holocaust except by silencing memory” (qtd. Edkins 2003:117). Such 
behaviour, though considered unethical by several scholars (Collado 2008:61), 
is understandable enough, since the instinct of self-preservation, the urge of 
protecting ourselves from any kind of pain is present, to a higher or lesser 
degree, in every human being. This is, basically, what Gemma does, and, 
according to Joseph –who has been tormented by years of constant 
remembering and reliving his trauma through dreams– it was “[j]ust  as well” 
(Yolen 2002:231). 
 On the other hand, attempts at silencing the memory of these historical 
events were not only carried out by the victims themselves, but by the 
perpetrators as well. It is broadly known that, after World War II, certain 
spheres insisted on convincing the public opinion that stories about the 
Holocaust and what went on in concentration and death camps had been nothing 
but maliciously spread rumours in order to move people to support the war 
against the Nazis. Such ideas, incredible as they may seem, still circulate 
nowadays which make the unearthing of the truth about the Holocaust though 
memorials and books still a necessity. 
 And yet, in some cases, the recovery of traumatic history is not done 
by the direct survivors themselves, but by their descendants, as is, for example, 
the instance of the African-American Community, whose history of slavery and 
oppression is being vindicated now in contemporary novels such as those of 
Tony Morrison or David Bradley, among others. Even if those descendants 
were not touched by their predecessors’ trauma, or if those experiences 
happened several centuries ago –as with the African-American history of 
slavery– they can sometimes be compelled to unearth the true story behind their 
forefathers’ hidden suffering in an attempt to overcome in their names their un-
worked through traumas. Such task falls, as María Jesús Martínez Alfaro argues 
(2009:348), on the hands of Becca, Gemma’s younger granddaughter, who 
travels to Poland after her grandmother’s demise in order to put together the 
clues along Gemma’s fairytale and discover the true story behind it. She is 
moved by the profound love she feels towards her grandmother, and it is 
through that love, as Gemma López Sánchez suggests, that the “purification of 
abject material” can be achieved. (2010:55) Becca knows this; she is conscious 
that her quest is not so much about recovering her grandmother’s forgotten past, 
but to work through it and attest for the rest of victims who could not pass on 
their stories. “Why am I doing this?” she wonders, to which she answers, “[f]or 
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Gemma” but she immediately corrects herself by saying “For all of us” (Yolen 
2002:104-105, italics in the original).  
 “Time may heal wounds, but it does not erase the scars” (Yolen 
2002:81), says Stan, one of the survivors with which Becca eventually speaks, 
and they are precisely those scars that future generations should be reminded of 
in order for them to avoid repeating the past’s horrible mistakes. Gemma 
herself, although apparently unaware of the truth of her traumatic past, seems to 
warn her granddaughters about the importance of this preserving of the past, 
and even do it herself though disguised as a fairy tale: “‘The future is when 
people talk about the past. So if the prince knows all their past lives and tells all 
the people who are still to come, then the princes live again and into the 
future’” (Yolen 2002:111, italics in the original). This use of the fairy tale in 
order to denounce the atrocities of history is something that, Jack Zipes argues, 
has been recurrent in literature after the Second World War: 
Following World War II, the fairy tale set once again to combat terror, 
but this time the terror concerned not only the inhibitions of the civilizing 
process, rationalization and alienation, but the demented and perverse forms 
of civilization that had in part caused atrocities and threatened to bring the 
world to the brink of catastrophe. (1991:xxvii) 
 Consequently, it should not come as a surprise that both Jane Yolen 
and John Boyne resorted to this type of fiction-writing to narrate such harsh 
stories as these two books are. “For countless centuries,” Terry Windling states 
in the introduction to the 2002 edition of Briar Rose, “storytellers have used the 
richly symbolic language of fairy tales to explore all the dark, and bright, and 
shades of grey of the human experience” (2002:xiv), and consequently, Yolen, 
as a fairy tale author and scholar, knows it “better than most” (2002:xiv) Boyne, 
on the other hand, has stated several times that The Boy in the Striped Pyjamas 
is not only a work of fiction, but a fable which he defines as “a piece of fiction 
that contains a moral.” (www.teenreads.com) What the moral is seems clear 
enough, and it goes back to the issue of giving voice to the victims of atrocities, 
honouring their memory and preventing a repetition, as Boyne seems to 
ironically imply with the closing lines of the book: “And that’s the end of the 
story about Bruno and his family. Of course all this happened a long time ago 
and nothing like that could ever happen again. Not in this day and age.” 
(2007:215, our emphasis) 
 To finish, and according to the above said, although a certain degree 
of blockage and repression of traumatic experiences is understandable and 
almost unavoidable, the realization of and coming to terms with reality and 
painful recollections is tantamount in order to avoid further mental damage. For 
Bruno, however, this realization comes too late, and he becomes aware of the 
terrible situation around him only when the current of events and the force of 
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his own delusion are about to take him to an early death. Gemma, on the other 
hand, although she dies still immersed in her world of fantasy, has somehow 
planted the seed in her younger granddaughter which moves her to eventually 
find out the truth and work through her grandmother’s trauma in her name. 
Although the memory transmitted to Becca is but a figment of reality, an 
illusion, that reality is still alive under its fairy tale disguise, and a number of 
clues have been dropped here and there alongside the story that serve as 
indicators and landmarks towards the recovery of the truth. Once this truth is 
unearthed and passed on by Becca to her boss and, presumably, the rest of her 
family, Gemma’s death and suffering have not been in vain. Consequently, 
Becca’s act of telling is a symbolic act of homage not only to her grandmother –
who is no longer alive– but to the rest of the victims, both the survivors and the 
deceased. 
 Such a homage and possibility of working through can likewise be 
achieved by means of writing, as numerous scholars have pointed out. 
Insomuch as “literature makes silence audible, and it verbalizes pain, bringing 
up its hidden causes” (Martínez Falquina 2009:514), the late proliferation of 
trauma narratives such as Briar Rose and The Boy in the Striped Pyjamas can be 
viewed as an attempt to “express repressed suffering” (Martínez Falquina 
2009:514) and move towards a common understanding and collective homage 
to all the victims that were overwhelmed by those dramatic episodes. Giving 
voice to such atrocities not only prevents forgetting, but also attempts to right 
past wrongs and provide the attention that victims –both collective and 
individual– merit. Just as Judith Herman points out, “telling the truth about 
terrible events are prerequisites both for the restoration of the social order and 
for the healing of individual victims” (2001:1). Therefore, books such as the 
here analysed pay homage to all those victims by giving voice to their suffering 
and bringing to the public eye the knowledge of the atrocities committed so 
that, hopefully, they will never be repeated. Just as is stated on an inscription at 
Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp, “the Europe of the future cannot exist 
without commemorating all those, regardless of their nationality, who were 
killed at that time with complete contempt and hate, who were tortured to death, 
starved, gassed, incinerated and hanged […]” (Andrezej Szczypiorski, Prisioner 
of the Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp, 1995). 
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